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ABSTRACT
Since the first theft of the Mt.Gox exchange service in 2011, Bitcoin has seen major
thefts in subsequent years. For most thefts, the perpetrators remain uncaught and
unknown. Although every transaction is recorded and transparent in the blockchain,
thieves can hide behind pseudonymity and use transaction obscuring techniques to
disguise their transaction trail. First, this paper investigates methods for transaction
tracking with tainting analysis techniques. Second, we propose new methods applied
to a specific theft case. Last, we propose a metrics-based evaluation framework to
compare these strategies with the goal of improving transaction tracking accuracy.
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1. Introduction
While Bitcoin is no longer the cryptocurrency with the most effective privacy sys-
tem today, it remains the most prominent and valuable cryptocurrency in use with
pseudonymous privacy to protect its users identities. This makes Bitcoin attractive
to individuals who are looking for a less traceable currency compared to traditional
currency to be used for illegal activities, whether it be for dark market transactions,
ransomware, scam, gambling, money laundering, prostitution, or even theft of the
cryptocurrency itself.
Such illegal activities can diminish Bitcoins value and its potential to become the
official alternative to traditional money. This also includes the cryptocurrency thefts
performed on multiple cryptocurrency exchange services. For example, security issues
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of the cryptocurrency service platforms that result in hacking and theft incidents
such as the hacking of the Coinrail exchange platform on 9th June 2018 with the
loss of 30 percent of their total cryptocurrency holding caused Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies prices to drop by almost 10 percent in one hour (Eric et al., 2018).
Since the thefts occurred at cryptocurrency services can affect both the service
and its direct users, they can also often cause a negative impact to the economy
of cryptocurrencies, which in-turn can affect other users, and even the real-world
economy to a degree. It is in the interests of cryptocurrency market participants, and
organisations such as the government, regulatory agencies as well as researchers to
be able to decipher and track the transaction network of a cryptocurrency, whether it
be for research, crime forensic, law enforcement, or personal interest purposes.
However, because of the privacy protection system of Bitcoin, the tracking of Bitcoin
transactions still remains a difficult challenge. In particular, the lack of precise identity
information and the existence of transaction obscuring methods such as laundering
services, ease of address creation, and anonymous connections with TOR network1,
allow the perpetrators of cryptocurrency theft to evade the grasp of law enforcement.
And while there is already some previous research that propose and develop tainting
analysis methods in an attempt to track the illegal Bitcoins, So far none of the research
present evaluation criteria to measure the accuracy of tainting results.
Therefore, this paper focuses on the analysis and tracking of Bitcoin transactions
that involve the theft of Bitcoins using transaction tainting analysis. The purpose of
this paper is to compare and evaluate tainting strategies, address profiling and to
suggest novel techniques that have the potential to provide superior tracking result.
Ultimately, the aim is to reveal the way forward, whereby misappropriated cryptocur-
rencies find their way into the real financial markets, in particular via money laundering
activities.
2. Bitcoin transaction tainting
Bitcoin uses an open, distributed transaction ledger called blockchain which allows
transaction flow to be easily traced and visualised. However, the tracking of Bitcoin
is still difficult to accomplish, especially in the case of finding the exact ownership of
1TOR is a software that allows user to anonymously connect to its network with data encryption as a gateway
to other networks or the Internet.
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tainted Bitcoins2. This is due to the fact that, aside from the pseudonymous system,
that the possession of Bitcoins in each address is in the form of unspent outputs3,
which are newly created from the sum of inputs4 of previous transactions. As a result,
when some (possibly stolen) inputs are combined with other inputs to become new
outputs, it is difficult to identify or classify the resulting output for tainting without
a clear and precise methodology. The main idea of tainting is that the stolen coins
are considered tainted (or dirty), and any address that uses or transfers them is also
considered to be a tainted address. As such, the tainted coins should not be accepted
by other users or businesses5; this is similar to how the blacklisting of addresses works.
2.1. Tainting methods discussed in the literature
The past literature identifies three strategies or methods for tracking transactions and
classifying tainting using transaction information from the blockchain: Poison, and
Haircut methods by Moser et al. (2014), and FIFO (First In, First Out) method by
Anderson et al. (2018). The following sections discuss in detail the above-mentioned
techniques.
2.1.1. Poison method
The Poison method is the simplest tainting strategy; the rule is that any transaction
output that originated from either a whole, or a part of, tainted input will be considered
as a tainted output regardless of the proportion of tainted Bitcoins involved (Moser
et al., 2014). This means that the clean Bitcoins involved in the transaction will also
become tainted, hence as the tainting progresses, the amount of tainted Bitcoin will
increase exponentially over time. Moser et al. (2014) argue that as the method works
only on transaction level and not address level, there is no risk of a criminal attempting
to sabotage publicly known addresses by purposely sending them a proportion of
tainted Bitcoins (so that it becomes mixed with other clean coins). This implies that
so long as innocent recipients do not use the tainted outputs along with clean outputs
2In this paper, tainted coin are the coins that are originally stolen from specific address while clean coins are
unrelated coins.
3The result of each transaction is stored in the form of output, which can be used in the next transaction.
4Input is a reference of the output from previous transaction that is being used in the transaction.
5Ideally, a warning signal could alert authorities that tainted coins are in circulation. If regulatory systems
would be in place, the address identified as belonging to the thief would immediately be flagged, and measures
would be taken to place stolen coins in quarantine.
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in the same transaction, their clean Bitcoins are safe from being tainted. While this
method is considered extreme in terms of the number of Bitcoins impacted, and it
has less practical use for both blacklisting and tracking, the tainting result can still be
used to provide a baseline sample or full tainted transaction network for further study
and analysis.
2.1.2. Haircut method
The Haircut method works in a similar way as the Poison method, but the Haircut
method implements an additional rule: the tainted output value is based on the pro-
portional value of the tainted input (Moser et al., 2014). The tainting compares the
proportion of clean and tainted currency in the outputs that are used as the inputs
of the new transaction, and each output will contain the proportion of tainted and
clean Bitcoins accordingly. For example, suppose that a transaction with two inputs,
1 clean Bitcoin and 1 tainted Bitcoin, is sent to two other addresses as two outputs,
each at 1 Bitcoin. Each resulting output will then contain a half portion (0.5 BTC)
of the tainted Bitcoins and another half (0.5 BTC) of the clean one. This means that
the resulting number of tainted addresses and transactions from both the Poison and
Haircut policies would be similar, as both consider all the outputs with tainted in-
puts in the transaction to be tainted. The only difference from the Poison method is
that the tainted Bitcoins do not affect the amount of the clean Bitcoins in the Haircut
method. As both Poison and Haircut methods consider every output in the transaction
to always receive a part of tainted input, the tainting often results in a large number
of tainted transactions and addresses, as the mixing between clean and tainted coins
increases. The end result of Poison and Haircut tainting methods usually concludes in
a vast portion of active Bitcoins in existence classified as tainted coins.
2.1.3. FIFO method
The FIFO Method (First In, First Out) uses a similar concept of asset inventory man-
agement to sort the order of tainting transaction that cannot be specifically identified.
The concept can be summarised as follows: the first item that goes in is also the one
that goes out first. In the Bitcoin case, the item would be the coins or transaction
outputs that are transferred from some addresses to others (Anderson et al., 2018).
Similar to the Poison and Haircut methods, FIFO also operates at the transaction
level by first looking at the order of inputs of the transaction, after which the method
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considers transaction outputs.
Anderson et al. (2018) argue that the FIFO method provides more precise tainting
results compared to Poison and Haircut methods, which would allow the government
or relevant organisation to implement clearer regulation or blacklisting. On another
note, it is worth mentioning that the FIFO method is used in the common law (in the
UK) for money distribution or withdrawal from an account originated from a historical
case in 1816 called Clayton’s case which is also one of the argument that Anderson
et al. (2018) provide for using FIFO over other methods.
Figure 1. Example of Bitcoin transaction where the actual transaction flow is opposite of the FIFO method
tainting result.
The diagram in Figure 1 demonstrates an example of a transaction with two inputs
and outputs. The red circle represents tainted input/coins. The black arrows represent
the transaction flow according to FIFO method, while the red arrows represent actual
flow.
However, the tainting result of this method does not necessarily reflect the transac-
tions contexts or intended purposes of the senders as demonstrated in Figure 1, where
the FIFO method would distribute the tainted coins into the second output based on
the transaction order, while the actual intended destination of the tainted coins is at
the first output. Hence, the actual context of the transaction can be a contradiction
to the tainting results of the FIFO method. As a result, while this method might solve
some issues for legal purposes, it still does not truly address the problem of tracking
accuracy, which is the main goal of the present research paper.
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3. Methodology
In this section, the tainting methods that we propose in this paper will be introduced.
Second, the attacker model for the transaction tainting that we used in this research
will be described, Third, we will discuss the address profiling method that we incor-
porated into our tainting methods. And finally, we will discuss the evaluation metrics
and the variable the we used to evaluate each tainting method.
3.1. Proposed new tainting methods
Using the same principle as the FIFO asset inventory management, there are new
strategies we propose to implement in the tainting process. We describe these two
proposals, the LIFO and TIHO methods below. Also mention that you modify the
above described methods by stopping the tainting at the service address. Also explain
why you are stopping the tainting there.
3.1.1. LIFO method
LIFO (Last In, First Out) is an alternative method to FIFO concept of asset inventory
management with the ordering reversed from FIFO. Instead of the assumption that
the first item that goes in is the first to go out, LIFO assumes the last item that goes
in is the first to go out.
As we discussed earlier that using FIFO method alone by itself cannot achieve the
aims of providing accurate tainting result, as there is a possibility that the result
of FIFO tainting does not match the actual flow of the transaction as shown in fig-
ure 1. Therefore, we will implement LIFO tainting method to evaluate whether such
possibility is true or not.
3.1.2. TIHO method
Using the same principle as in the FIFO and LIFO methods, we design a new tainting
method based on the transaction order, but also incorporate the context of the tainting
which is the tainting classification itself into the tainting algorithm. The fundamental
assumption in this method is that in the transactions that involve the mixing of clean
and tainted coins, the resulting transaction output that has highest value or in other
word the address that receives the highest amount of Bitcoins is the main purpose or
target of the transaction, and that tainted inputs are the most important inputs of
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the transaction. In summary, this method prioritises the distribution of the tainted
input to the outputs with higher values first, then the remaining clean inputs will be
distributed to the other outputs afterwards. We call this tainting method, Taint In,
Highest Out (TIHO). We introduce this method to test the potential of using other
transaction information as the tainting variables beside the transaction order which
in this case are the tainting classification and the value of the transaction outputs.
This method is not without limitation as the method can still be manipulated by an
attacker to purposely make the intended output small in the transaction. Although,
there are valid reasons for small outputs such as using large value Unspent Transac-
tion Outputs6 to purchase products from a merchant. Similar to using a large value
banknote to buy a cheap product, this would mean that the outputs that go to the
merchant address, so the output that is sent to purchase the product would be smaller
than the change outputs which is the remaining that goes back to the address be-
longing to owner of the transaction. For such reasons, this method can be somewhat
accurate mostly during the early phases of transferring tainted coins when the tainted
coins are still likely to be in the thiefs possession.
3.2. Attacker Model
The attacker model implemented in this paper uses the concept of transaction tainting.
The tainting starts from at least one known and confirmed account involved in theft
and linking together related multiple transactions and addresses using mainly the
information from the blockchain. It is worth noting that the tainting itself does not
directly deanonymise the addresses involved, however the resulting transaction pattern
found from the tainting can be used to help accomplish such an objective. In this
paper, the tainted address classification is slightly different than the ones proposed in
the previous literature: an address would be considered tainted only after it uses the
tainted coins; we will classify an address as being tainted by just receiving the tainted
coins for tracking purposes.
3.3. Address Profiling
Although deanonymisation, which aims to reveal the real identity of Bitcoin addresses,
is not the goal of this paper, we believe that tainting should be context-aware and be
6Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) is an output that still haven’t been used in any transaction.
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adapted to the type of addresses that are being tainted. Tainting indiscriminately
would miss our goal to understand theft strategies. Address profiling is one of the
methods that can assist the tainting process by providing the context for the tainting
so that it can track the transactions more precisely. As a result, we classify the address
into three categories using the information available in the blockchain and the result
of tainting methods as follows.
3.3.1. Service address
In this paper, we consider a service address to be an address that has very high trans-
action traffic compared to other addresses. A high transaction traffic often implies
that the address is a point of central exchange for many users, similar to how busi-
nesses operate in the real world. Services in cryptocurrencies exist in many forms with
different purposes such as the followings:
(1) Cryptocurrency exchange services, where users can exchange cryptocurrency for
real money or other cryptocurrencies, e.g., Kraken, Bitflinex or Mt.Gox.
(2) E-commerce businesses that accept payment with cryptocurrency, e.g., Mi-
crosoft, Newegg, Humblebundle and Expedia, among others. This also includes
marketplaces or websites that facilitate transactions for the user such as Darknet
market likes Silk Road and Dream Market or gambling sites.
(3) Websites or organisational donation sites that accept Bitcoins as donation, e.g.,
Wikipedia, Reddit, 4Chan and Wikileaks, among others.
(4) Laundering/mixing services, which are a type of service that helps randomising
the transaction flow for the users to make it more difficult to track, such as
the Helix Mixer, Coinmixer and Bitblender. The service would take a certain
amount of Bitcoin from the mixed transaction as their fee, which is usually
based on the complexity and number of mixing requested. Each mixing service
usually employs different types of mixing methods, but generally the complexity
of the mixing is more sophisticated with a higher number of mixing transactions,
randomness and mixing time (Moser et al., 2013).
In this paper, we classify service addresses by looking at the transaction traffic of the
tainted addresses and comparing to other addresses within a similar time period. If a
tainted address has considerable higher transaction number than the average addresses
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at the time, then it will be classified as a service address. The classification process
and the selection of the boundary for the service addresses will be described in more
detailed in the Section 4.
Additionally, we consider service addresses to be the end goal or exit point of the
tainted transaction. This assumes that all Bitcoin transactions, including those with
stolen coins, have the purpose to reach its uses to achieve the real-world monetary
value, and thus for the analysis in this paper we consider service addresses to be the
exit point or medium of exchange for the coins.
3.3.2. Tainted address
A tainted (or dirty) address is any address that the tainting methods consider to be
tainted from interacting with the tainted Bitcoins regardless of the amount. As each
tainting method employs different ways of tracking and classification, each tainted
address may or may not be classified as tainted in each method. Likewise, the tainted
addresses may or may not belong to the accomplices of the theft incident, as Bitcoin
addresses can be easily created without any cost. In this paper, we use the same classi-
fication of tainted address as previous literature, but with an exception for the service
addresses. In other words, for our results, such as the number of tainted addresses, we
dont count beyond the first encounter of a service address when implementing any of
the tainting methods (Poison, Haircut, FIFO, LIFO, and TIHO).
As we incorporate the address profiling into each tainting method, the tainting
methods used in this paper are a slightly different version from the ones presented in
the previous literature. As mentioned in service address subsection that by limiting
the tainting to stop for the coins that already been used, we believe that the tainting
result would become more precise. Therefore, the tainting result of the methods used
in this paper would also be different. As such, we will indicate the inclusion of the
address profiling in the methods with asterisk sign (*) behind the method name.
Due to the reason that we are using only data from the blockchain for our tainting
analysis in this paper, it is still possible for the tainting method to classify addresses
that belong to services as a tainted address (in case we dont recognize an address
as belonging to a service) especially for services that use multiple few use addresses
instead of reusing same addresses multiple times.
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3.3.3. Clean address
A normal or clean address is any address that does not yet receive any tainted coin.
In the same way as tainted addresses, normal or clean addresses can also belong to
the theft accomplices depending on how the tainting method operates. Some tainting
methods may mistakenly consider an address as clean, e.g., even when it is the recipient
address of stolen coins.
3.4. Evaluation matrix
In order to evaluate the performance of each tainting strategy, we have created an
evaluation matrix using information that is available in the blockchain data. We discuss
these evaluation metrics in the subsections below.
3.4.1. Transaction fee
A Transaction fee is the number of Bitcoins specified by the transaction sender as an
incentive for a miner to prioritise the transaction over other transactions contained in
the process of block mining. The transaction fee is taken from the difference of inputs
and outputs of the (Nakamoto, 2009). Normally, the transaction fee is calculated from
the data size of the transaction, which comes mainly from the number of inputs and
outputs within the transaction, and the number of transactions that are waiting to be
confirmed at the same time.
A Miner is a person or a group of individuals that are the first to complete the
block mining challenge provided by the Bitcoin protocol. The challenge involves miners
finding the hash of the block they are going to create that is lower than the provided
target, which is calculated from the total mining computation power of every miner
who participated in the mining of the previous blocks. Miners will receive rewards such
as specific number of Bitcoins and transaction fees for all the transactions included
in the block that they mined in the form of the first transaction in the block called
Coinbase transaction (Franco, 2015). While mining could be accomplished by a single
person during the early years of Bitcoin, as more individuals join to compete for
mining due to increasing value and reputation of Bitcoin, the cost-effectiveness of
being a single miner decrease. As a result, miners instead typically join mining pools
to complete the block mining together and then distribute the reward based on each
contribution to the mining.
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In this paper, we hypothesize that the amount of the transaction fee in tainted
transactions will be higher than normal transactions in order for the thief to obscure
his/her transaction trail by rapidly moving the stolen coins; therefore, he/she needs to
provide sufficient incentive through the transaction fee to accomplish this. As a result,
the tainting strategy with better tracking accuracy should have overall higher average
transaction fee for the tainted transactions according to our hypothesis.
3.4.2. Reaching a Service address; the end point of a transaction trail
Using the address profiling method mentioned in section 3.2.1 to classify service ad-
dresses, we can observe the point in transaction flow when the tainted coins are received
by a service address. We hypothesize that as the thief would want to spend the stolen
coins as soon as possible in order to minimise the transaction trail - as the longer the
stolen coins are still in his/her possession - the higher the chance for it to be detected.
The tainting strategy that shows the earliest route to any service address is more likely
to be more accurate in our hypothesis.
3.4.3. Privacy and transaction obscuring measure
While privacy protection is one of the most important aspects of Bitcoin, many users
are believed to not be as privacy conscious as can be observed from the high frequency
of reusing addresses (Harrigan and Fretter, 2016). However, due to the nature of
the transactions involving theft, we argue that a thief would likely try to employ
transactions obscuring and privacy techniques as much as possible in order to prevent
tracking. Avoiding the reuse of the same address multiple times is one such technique,
as the Blockchain system (including exchanges) allows users to easily create multiple
new addresses in a matter of minutes. We assume that the thief would try to avoid using
any address more than once in order to reduce the traceability of the transactions. So,
we can use this basis as one of the hypotheses to test the accuracy of each tainting
strategy.
The reused address metric does not include service addresses, nor any transac-
tions outside of the limit tainting period. Rather, we will classify addresses that have
transactions including ones from the outside of the limit time period prior to receiving
tainted coins as fresh address. Moreover, since the system allows the user to send their
Bitcoins to any address without requiring confirmation from the receiver address, we
will classify reused addresses using only the number of sending transactions.
11
4. Results
In this paper, we use a historical theft as a sample for testing the transaction tainting
analysis. The case we are going to use is the Bter hack from 2015, which resulted in
theft of 7,170 Bitcoins with the total value of 1.7 million USD at the time (Higgins,
2015). Bter is a cryptocurrency exchange service located in China. Its service was shut
down in 2017 due to the Chinese governments ban on the use of cryptocurrency in
that year.
In this paper, we use a historical theft as a sample for testing the transaction
tainting analysis. The case we are using is the Bter hack of 2015, which resulted in
theft of 7,170 Bitcoins with the total value of 1.7 million USD at the time (Higgins,
2015). Bter is a cryptocurrency exchange service located in China. Its service was
shut down in 2017 due to the Chinese governments ban on the use of cryptocur-
rency. The theft occurred on 2015-02-14 at 04:32:26 where the hacker stole 7,170
Bitcoins from the Bter cold wallet exchange7. At the time, the exchange temporarily
suspended its service and announced the theft the following day and announced a
bounty for providing information about the thief (Higgins, 2015). The theft involved
only one initial transaction in which coins were moved from Bters cold wallet ad-
dress to two other addresses which are 1FETsHZyjppcs8KJUvh82vNCNqsJYD5pWy and
1KPNHv8mfMPNivHptAiwwytUVZmzovVF8f.
Table 1. The Number of transactions and addresses in each specified time limit.
For this paper, to test each tainting method, to limit the amount of computational
resources required and time taken for our evaluation, we limited the tainting of the
transactions to within 4 days after the first distribution transaction of the stolen coins
7Cold wallet is a type of address that does not connect to any network or internet to protect against security
breach. This can be accomplished by storing it in offline storage such as USB drive, paper, safe, external hard
drive, offline computer and so on.
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from block 343401. Table 1 shows the exact total number of all transactions and the
addresses that appear in the blocks within the time period limit. To test and evaluate
the tainting methods, we divide the time limit period into 5 periods which are 6 hours,
12 hours, 1 days, 2 days and 4 days to show gradual change of the results within the
space of limited time.
To put this theft into perspective, the total number of Bitcoins in every transaction,
excluding the initial theft transaction is 3,692,467.31451518 Bitcoins. At the exchange
value of 230 USD per 1 Bitcoin at the time of the theft, this equals to around 85
million USD compare to the 7,170 Bitcoins theft has a value of 1.7 million USD which
is around 2 percent of total transaction value within 4 days.
4.1. Service Address Classification
In order to find the most efficient classification of the service addresses, we use the total
number of transactions of all addresses that appear in the same limited time period as
the sample data; next, we compare the number of transactions of every address that
appears in the blockchain within a six-month period of the theft (three months before
and after the theft transaction). There are 17,466,256 transactions and 22,266,571
active addresses in total within the six months period. The results of transaction
number percentiles and the service address classification results of each percentile can
be seen in Table 2.
Table 2. Percentile of the transactions number of all active addresses within three months before and after
the theft transaction.
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In this experiment, we choose the classification of service addresses to be at the
very top percentile of all addresses in the time limit at 99th percentile. As shown in
in Figure 2, the majority of the addresses have a low number of transactions at only
around two transactions, but the total number of transaction increases exponentially
for the addresses at the top percentile. This finding appears to be in line with the
finding of Dorit and Adi (2012), which means that sufficient number of users of Bitcoins
are concerned enough about their privacy and avoid reusing the same address multiple
times. At the 99th percentile, the transaction number required for an address to be
classified as a service address is at 18 transactions. At this percentile, 8,058 out of
1,006,212 addresses would be classified as service addresses.
Figure 2. Percentile distribution graph of addresses transaction number within the four days limit with
binary logarithm transformation for transaction amount.
Choosing the lower percentile would mean a higher chance to include services that
employ transaction obscuring techniques, such as laundering service addresses; more-
over, it would also increase the chance of false classification of normal addresses. How-
ever, it should be noted that there are still many individuals who reuse their address,
as pointed out in Harrigan and Fretter (2016). Thus, there is still a possibility that
the top percentile addresses are actually not service addresses.
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Table 3. The results of each tainting method on the sample data within the four days limit.
8Due to the fact that we incorporate the address profiling into every tainting method in this paper, the
tainting methods used in this paper is a slightly different version than the one present in previous literature.
As such, we indicate the inclusion of the address profiling in the methods with asterisk sign (*) behind the
method name.
9Sat/Satoshis is a smallest unit in Bitcoin value. 1 Bitcoin is equal to 100,000,000 Satoshis.
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4.2. Poison* and Haircut*
As the Poison* and Haircut* methods consider all the involved outputs to be tainted,
the number of tainted transactions for both methods are the same including the ad-
dresses. Hence, we will combine the Poison and Haircut* methods together in the
results and discussion section.
The Poison and Haircut* tainting methods result in the highest number of tainted
addresses and transactions compared to other tainting methods as shown in Table 3.
The results of the Poison* and Haircut* tainting display an intriguing pattern that
we didnt expect. While we expect that due to the nature of Poison* and Haircut*
method, the number of tainted transactions and addresses would be much higher than
the other methods. The number of tainted transactions and addresses that increase
within such short amount of time is at a much higher rate than we expected at first.
The number of tainted transactions and addresses increase exponentially within the
first day of the tainting period. Furthermore, the tainted coins manage to reach 7
addresses that we classify as service addresses within the first six hours after the first
distribution transaction of the stolen coins. Within the first day of the tainting, the
tainted coins managed to spread to 55,099 addresses with 11,256 transactions in total
and as high as 939 service addresses receive a portion of the tainted coins. At the end
of the time limit tainting, there are 69,840 tainted transactions that involve 255,831
addresses and 3,502 service addresses in total.
The number of reused addresses in the Poison* and Haircut* tainting results are con-
siderably high at around 10 percent of the total addresses, though the ratio of reused
addresses to total tainted addresses decreases over time. Interestingly, the number of
fresh addresses (the addresses that receive tainted transactions as its first transaction)
is very high throughout the entire time period. The average value of transaction fee
in tainted transactions decreases over time, yet the fee proportion to the size of the
transaction actually increases over time.
The first tainted transaction that involves a service address occurs on block 343,435
which is mined at 12:30:29 on 2015-02-14. The transaction occurs roughly 5 hours after
the stolen coins’ distribution transaction on block 343,401 at 07:34:04 on 2015-02-14.
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4.3. FIFO*
As shown in Table 3, The FIFO* tainting method results in a much lower number
of tainted transactions and addresses compared to the Poison* and Haircut* meth-
ods; moreover, the number of tainted transactions and addresses increase much more
steadily compared to the Poison* and Haircut* methods. On the first day of tainting
using the FIFO* method, there are 60 tainted transactions with 105 addresses involved
and only 2 service addresses appear to receive the tainted coins. On the fourth day,
there are 91 tainted transactions and 149 tainted addresses in total. The number of
service addresses does not increase further after the first day of tainting.
The number of reused addresses in the Poison* and Haircut* tainting is higher
during the first day of tainting, unlike for the Poison* and Haircut* methods, which
is at about 20 to 30 percent of the total address. However, similar to the Poison* and
Haircut* methods, the ratio of reused addresses to total tainted addresses decreases
on the following days. However, the number of fresh addresses is considerably less
than for the Poison* and Haircut* methods throughout each tainting time period.
The average value of transaction fee is much higher than for the Haircut* method and
increases over time; yet, the fee-size proportion of transaction fee pattern is similar,
though lower, in comparison to the Poison* and Haircut* methods.
For the FIFO* tainting, the first tainted transaction that involves service addresses
occurs on block 343,469 which is mined at 17:01:30. The transactions occur around 9
hours after the first stolen coins distribution transaction.
4.4. LIFO*
As shown in Table 3, the LIFO* tainting methods results show a similar pattern com-
pared to the FIFO* method results overall; the number of tainted transactions and
addresses is slightly lower compared to the FIFO* method results. On the first day
of the LIFO* tainting, there are 56 tainted transactions with 109 addresses involved
including 2 service addresses. Further, the number of service addresses does not in-
crease further afterwards. On the fourth day, there are 78 tainted transactions and
140 tainted addresses in total.
The number of reused addresses in the LIFO* tainting is almost the same as for the
FIFO* tainting method throughout the entire period, including the ratio to the total
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number of addresses. However, the number of fresh addresses is slightly lower than
the FIFO* method. Unexpectedly, the average value of transaction fee is much higher
than both the Poison*, Haircut* and FIFO* methods including the proportion to the
transaction size. The average transaction fee is as high as 68,938 Satoshis compared
to 48,500 Satoshis for the FIFO* method and 25,799 Satoshis in the Poison* and
Haircut* tainting methods. Although, the average value and ratio of the transaction
fee gradually decreases on the following days, similar to the Poison*, Haircut*, and
FIFO* methods.
The first tainted transaction that involves service address in the LIFO* method is
the same one as in the FIFO* method, which occurs on block 343,469.
4.5. TIHO*
As shown in Table 3, the TIHO* tainting methods results show a similar pattern to the
FIFO* and LIFO* methods overall, albeit with a smaller number of tainted transac-
tions and addresses. On the first day of the TIHO* tainting, only 44 transactions and
83 addresses are considered to be tainted. The number of service addresses is similar
to the FIFO* and LIFO* methods. In the end, there are 68 tainted transaction and
115 addresses in total.
The number of reused and fresh addresses in the TIHO* tainting is slightly lower
than for the FIFO* and LIFO* methods but shows a similar increasing pattern as
for the other two methods. However, the TIHO* method has a higher number of
reused and total addresses ratio than the other two methods. The average value of
transaction fee is considerably higher than in the other tainting methods at the early
tainting period, but becomes lower than the LIFO* method afterwards, while still
much higher than FIFO*, Poison* and Haircut* methods. Despite the higher average
transaction fee value, the transaction fee per byte ratio is closer to the FIFO* method
than the LIFO* method.
The first tainted transaction that involves a service address in the TIHO* method
is the same as the FIFO* and LIFO* methods, which occurs on block 343,469.
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Figure 3. The number of overlapping tainted transactions between three tainting methods within the 4 days
tainting limit.
Figure 4. The number of overlapping addresses that receive tainted coins between three tainting methods
within the 4 days tainting limit.
As shown in Figure 3 and 4, a significant number of tainted transactions and ad-
dresses are considered to be tainted by all the three tainting methods. The FIFO* and
LIFO* methods have similar portions of tainted transaction and address that are not
shared by the other methods. The TIHO* tainting yields almost the same tainting
result as the FIFO* method in this sample case, with a minor difference in the tainted
address result.
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Figure 5. The number of tainted coins received by service addresses at each limit time period for all the
tainting methods.
Despite a very high number of service addresses in the Poison* and Haircut* meth-
ods, the value of tainted coins that reach service addresses is still rather low as can
be seen in Figure 5. This means that most of the transactions that involve service ad-
dresses consist of a very low number of Bitcoins overall. The amount of tainted coins
that manage to reach the service addresses is very low, at roughly 0.4 percent of the
total tainted coins for all four tainting methods.
The experiment has limitation of the lack of control group for evaluation of the
tainting methods. So, we cannot yet compare the tainting result to normal/clean trans-
actions for further evaluation in this paper.
5. Discussion and Evaluation
The result of Poison* and Haircut* tainting methods yield very intriguing and unex-
pected results. As can be seen in Table 2, the number of transactions that the Poison*
and Haircut* methods considered to contain tainted coins is very high on the first
day (almost 10 percent of total transactions). We assume that the thief distributes
the tainted coins in a rapid fashion with high possibility involving money laundering
services multiple times right within the first day of the theft. As our implementation
of the tainting methods stops tainting at the addresses that have a very high number
of transaction traffic within the time period (i.e., likely a service address), the taint-
ing process is not yet able to effectively detect money laundering service addresses
considering the low number of transactions.
However, even with the lack of money laundering transaction analysis and profiling,
the number of addresses that the tainting considers to be a service entity after one day
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is considerably high at 939. There are three possible explanations for the high number
of service address that the tainted coins manage to reach within the first day for
Haircut and Poison methods. First, the thief employed the services of the laundering
services to mix the tainted coins, then the laundering services mix the tainted coins
with other clean coins from other users and distribute a portion of them to the other
users that also employ the mixing services. This would create a possibility that the
addresses that spend the tainted coins on the service addresses that we detected is
actually owned by unrelated users. Second, the thief himself spent the stolen coins right
away on the first day of the theft. Third, some of the service addresses are actually
not service addresses, meaning the users reuse their addresses multiple times.
While we cannot yet confirm which possibility is correct due to the lack of consec-
utive money laundering analysis, we cannot prove or disprove either of the first and
second theory. The third theory can be partially true as while many users do indeed
reuse their address, it is still quite unlikely that many non-service addresses would
have enough transactions to reach the top percentile of all the addresses. In any case,
the only way we can truly disprove those possibilities is by performing further analyses
of the involved addresses while considering additional information.
Another consideration that should also be taken into account is that illegal activities
are one of the most important aspects of the Bitcoin economy, considering that as high
as 33 percent of all Bitcoin transaction involve illegal activities (Foley et al., 2018).
Thus, the classification of service addresses as an exit point of tainted transactions
that use only transaction traffic may not be sufficient enough, considering that thieves
would more likely prefer spending the stolen coins on the exit points, with the least
chance of being caught, as opposed to official services like cryptocurrency exchange
services at which governments can enforce laws. As the services or businesses that
engage in illegal activities are likely to employ transaction obscuring techniques to
protect their own privacy, the address profiling should not solely rely on the number
of transactions alone in order to capture more accurate result.
The result of the FIFO*, LIFO* and TIHO* methods display very similar patterns
and value, especially during the first six hours. This entails that the majority of the
transactions during the first day consists of simple structures of input and output with
low amounts of coin mixing, hence the minor difference in value. Yet, the results at
the end of the first day and afterwards show significant difference in value between the
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three tainting methods, despite considerable amount of overlap of transactions and
addresses, as shown in Figure 3 and 4.
Overall, the FIFO* tainting result has the higher number of tainted transactions
and addresses including the number of reused and fresh addresses of all the three
tainting methods. However, in term of proportion between total tainted, reused and
fresh addresses, the FIFO* tainting method performs better than both LIFO* and
TIHO* methods, considering our hypothesis that the thief would less likely to reuse
addresses in order to reduce transactions traceability.
For the transaction fee variable, even though each tainting method presents varied
results for both the average fee value and size ratio, they seem to all share the same
pattern in changing their value throughout the entire tainting period. Also, while all of
the tainting methods have similar results in this aspect during the early tainting, the
results seem to greatly diverge passing the first half of the first day tainting. The FIFO*
method results in a much lower average transaction fee in its tainted transactions for
both value and size ratio compared to the LIFO* and TIHO* methods. For the LIFO*
method, the tainted transactions have much higher transaction fee than the other
two. Based on our hypothesis, the LIFO* tainting results provide the most accurate
tracking result in this aspect, followed by the TIHO* and FIFO* methods.
Table 4. The transaction fee of clean transactions according to Poison* and Haircut* methods within 4 days
limit period.
In order to evaluate the transaction fee results, we also extract the transaction fee
of all other clean transactions according to Poison* and Haircut* methods within the
same time period as the tainted transaction, which can be used to represent the average
transaction fee at the time as shown in Table 4. The transaction fee value and size
ratio of the clean transactions are constant throughout the four days period at around
15000 Satoshis and 37 Satoshis per byte. Compared to the tainting results, the average
transactions fee for the clean transactions is much lower for every limit time period.
However, the transaction fee size ratio is much higher than the tainted transactions
from all four tainting methods. We can interpret this difference as follows: due to
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the higher-than-average value of the stolen coins, the tainted transactions would have
much higher transaction fee value than the average transactions in the same period.
Although, interestingly, the fee size ratio of tainted transactions in this sample case is
much lower than the average transactions ratio. Therefore, it is likely that the thief
prioritises saving the stolen coins rather than the speed of transaction confirmation
into the block in this sample theft case.
Based on our transaction fee hypothesis, the assumption that the thief would in-
clude a higher transaction fee to speed up the transaction confirmation time does not
perfectly match the common pattern shown in the result and comparison to the av-
erage clean transaction fee in this sample case. The inclusion of those variables still
provides an interesting insight due to the distinct difference in transaction fees between
the tainted transaction and clean transaction.
While the address profiling of service addresses that we incorporated into the taint-
ing shows interesting results in the Poison* and Haircut* method as there are as high
as 3,502 service addresses receiving the tainted coins, our hypothesis for service reach-
ing that the thief would like to try to spend the stolen coins as soon as possible is
in contradiction to the results shown in Figure 5. Although, the number of service
addresses is very high in the Poison* and Haircut* methods, the total value of the
tainted coins that reach a service is very low compared to the total tainted coins in-
volved for every tainting method. This ineffectiveness may be the result of the short
evaluation period, as there is also a possibility that the thief would try to lay low,
until the public awareness decreases before spending the stolen coins.
Nevertheless, the results still prove that there is already certain amount of tainted
coins that manage to reach addresses that are likely to belong to service entities as soon
as the first four days of the tainted coin distribution. This means that the integration
of address profiling into the tainting method can improve further the tainting exer-
cise, while providing a more accurate and detailed profiling for both classification and
address profiling. This can be achieved by incorporating additional techniques such
as address clustering in the likes of input sharing clustering, transaction behaviour
clustering, and so on.
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6. Conclusion and Future Work
While the privacy that Bitcoin can bring to users is revolutionary in todays modern
society, the privacy features to commit crimes or even cause harm to others which
also bring a negative image to Bitcoin as can often be seen in todays news. In an
attempt to combat crime and illegal activities in Bitcoin, tracing the coins to the end
of the blockchain alone would only show who are the unlucky winners to be the last
holders of dirty coins chosen by the tainting process. In order to truly track the crime
in Bitcoin, it is crucial to understand the context of each transaction involved.
The context of the transaction can be obtained by combining both blockchain in-
formation and external information that are available in public such as forum website
(Michael et al., 2015). The variables we used to analyse the context of transaction in
this paper are the transaction information that can be found directly in the blockchain.
Such information cannot be falsified due to the nature of the blockchain and bitcoin
protocol itself. However, in the case of retrieving the information from external sources,
there is a risk of the information being either incorrect or purposely falsified, so extra
caution must be exercised when handling external information.
The result of our experiment shows that some of our hypotheses are in conflict
of the actual result which means that the comparison between each tainting method
still requires further analysis and validation before we can truly measure and evaluate
their accuracy. Still, the hypothesis variables that we applied show potential to be
used further as evaluation variables in the taint analysis.
The address profiling process can be developed further by incorporating additional
techniques such as address clustering and network analysis techniques to assist in the
address profiling process, incorporating other information of the transaction as evalua-
tion variables and analysis, Address profiling can also incorporate network analysis to
analyse the transaction network to find out the structure patterns of transaction and
address, the result can then be used to discern the transaction flow and relationship
of the addresses involved in the tainted transaction (Bianconi and Agrawal, 2017).
This paper laid the foundation for our future work on transaction tainting analysis
to not only discover the most accurate tainting strategy but to also improve upon
the current tainting analysis methods. The results of transaction tainting can then be
used for assisting cybersecurity in combating against cryptocurrency cybercrime. This
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will have important implications not only to cybersecurity but to financial regulatory
developments.
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